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INTRODUCTION
Unemployment is one of South Africa's most pressing problems. Various
solutions to this problem have been proposed. Elsewhere in Africa
employment creation programmes have been established within the public
sector; in particular, rural roads have been constructed and maintained by
labour-intensive methods. Per unit of expenditure labour-intensive methods
create significantly more employment than conventional methods of
construction. Labour-intensive methods are economically efficient and
result in as high a standard of construction as the level of funding will
allow.
In South Africa, there is a widely acknowledged need for housing and
municipal infrastructure (water supply, sewerage, streets, storm water
drainage, electricity, refuse collection). While the emphasis is generally
upon urban or peri-urban conditions, there is also a need for physical
infrastructure in the rural areas. From a theoretical perspective,
supported by experience elsewhere in Africa, there are reasons for
considering that properly constituted employment creation programmes, based
on labour-intensive methods, could be established to construct and maintain
the required physical infrastructure.
From 1975 to 1987 the author was involved in employment creation
projects and programmes in Iran, Botswana and Kenya. Based on research and
practical experience the author has proposed a strategy to achieve
employment creation in construction. Since his return to South Africa in
September 1987, he has been involved both in debate about the subject and
in various employment creation projects. Several difficulties have been
experienced. Lessons have been learned which could be useful for future
programmes.
Following a summary of the main tenets of labour-intensive
construction and a brief description of progress elsewhere in Africa, this
paper outlines the potential contribution which employment creation
programmes could make to alleviating the unemployment problem and a
strategy for achieving results. The paper then describes the problems that
have been experienced or observed in South Africa in relation to employment
creation construction projects. This highlights various issues which
require attention. Evidence from the discussion of the problem areas will
then be used to criticise two current projects that claim to be using
labour-intensive methods. The paper closes with some recommendations for
the future. Throughout the paper there are aspects which require research
to attain greater clarity.
Before dealing with the potential and the problems of employment
creation in construction several issues related to the unemployment problem
in South Africa will be discussed: its extent and deleterious side
effects; some of the current proposals to solve unemployment; some local
and international experience regarding programmes to solve unemployment.
UNEMPLOYMENT
The level of unemployment is difficult to delineate accurately because
people are employed in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy
and reasonable statistics only exist for the formal sector. Using
unpublished data Kritzinger-Van Niekerk recently showed that the estimated
percentage of people without formal jobs rose from 33,5% in 1974 to 51,3%
in 1990.
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1960      2 249 000 32,6
1974      3 427 000 33,5
1990      8 370 000 51,3
Manipulating the same data Kritzinger-Van Niekerk also showed that
between 1960 and 1965 the formal sector had been able to absorb 80,9% of
the annual net additions to the labour force; between 1986 and 1990 this
had shrunk to 8,4% (Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, 1991).
Using data on the formal and informal sectors from unpublished
population census information it was estimated that unemployment grew from
7,2% in 1980 to 13,2% in 1989 (Ligthelm and Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, 1990).
The levels of unemployment vary significantly from region to region: 10,8%
in the Cape Peninsular to an average of 29% in the "homelands" (Kritzinger-
Van Niekerk, 1991). Even these figures do not quite capture the severity
of unemployment on a disaggregated basis. Estimates of unemployment rates
in some settlements vary from 36 to 60% (Reilly, 1989; Fourie, 1988;
Odensk-Duke, 1990(a)). While it might be difficult to define the exact
level of unemployment there is no doubt that it has increased dramatically
over the past thirty years.
Not only has the level of unemployment increased but the economy has
become more capital-intensive. Kritzinger-Van Niekerk reports that for the
period 1971-1980 one per cent annual economic growth resulted in 0,64%
growth in employment; between 1981 and 1990 one per cent annual economic
growth only resulted in 0,46% growth in employment; for the period 1986
to 1990 the latter had shrunk to 0,30. The drop in this percentage - by
more than a quarter during the 1980's as a whole and by a half for the
period 1986 to 1990 - indicates the extent to which the economy is becoming
more capital-intensive. Similar opinions have been expressed by the Bureau
for Economic Research (Steyn, 1990). Between 1986 and 1990, for any
additional expenditure less than half the additional employment was created
than during the period 1971-80. In this respect Ligthelm and Kritzinger-
Van Niekerk concluded: "Thus unemployment in South Africa has increasingly
assumed structural features implying it is related not only to the level
but also to the pattern of economic activity in the country."
Although the actual level of unemployment is debatable, a survey to
determine the most severe problem areas in South African society found that
all the four population groups (as then defined) identified unemployment as
"the foremost problem field" (Whittle, 1990, quoted in Ligthelm and
Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, 1990). This has been reflected at some political
levels. One of the first items of the ANC's Development Policy is "job
creation" (ANC, 1990). While there are political roots to violence it is
exacerbated by the high level of unemployment. Other commentators have
given searing accounts of the deleterious effects on individuals of being
unemployed (Ramphele and Wilson, 1989). The combination of unemployment
and violence has led to extreme levels of stress (Odensk-Duke, 1990(a) and
(b)). Even if AIDs has the impact projected by some there will still be at
least ten years in which the levels of unemployment will remain extremely
high.
RESPONSES
Several opinions have been expressed regarding solving the
unemployment problem. These have included:
(i) Growth in the whole economy with particular emphasis upon export
orientation.
(ii) Encouragement of small businesses,
(iii) Decentralisation,
(iv) Growth in the informal sector.
The author is not equipped to discuss adequately the merits and
demerits of each of these responses. However, following these routes the
creation of employment will only take place when the whole economy begins
to expand. The South African economy is not expanding. From a growth rate
of 5,8% in the 1960s and 2,9% in the 1970s the growth rate fell to 1,4%
during the 1980s, with a negative growth rate for 1990. And it was shown
above that during the period 1981 to 1990 less employment was created per
unit of expenditure than during the period 1971 to 1980.
While undoubtedly one must look to the growth of the whole economy to
solve the unemployment problem, at present as the economy is not expanding
one should also look to ways of creating employment within the existing
economy. This does not imply that major emphasis should not be placed upon
policies to expand the economy as a whole; simply that additional policies
are required to re-structure current activities so as to create greater
employment opportunities within existing budgetary constraints. Such
policies were pursued in South Africa and the USA during the Great
Depression. During the 1970s and 1980s at least one UN agency, the
International Labour Organisation, has been active in this field.
During the 1920s and 1930s public sector programmes of one kind or
another were used in order to alleviate the "poor white" problem (Abedian
and Standish, 1985; 1986). In 1989 Ramphele and Wilson argued that public
works programmes would be necessary to relieve present unemployment (Wilson
and Rarapheli, 1989). Recently, COSATU convened a seminar on "One Million
Jobs by 1992". The purpose of the seminar was to review experience and
opinions about public works programmes and to develop a strategy for the
future. Papers presented at the seminar included "Job Creation Schemes in
the United States in the Depression" (Nicol, 1991), "International Job
Creation Schemes" (Trade Union Research Project (TURP), August 1991),
"Information on Public Works Programs in South Africa" (TURP, July 1991),
"Public Works Programme in South Africa" (Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, 1991) and
the author gave a presentation on the issues to consider when planning a
public works programme.
The seminar provided a very useful background to the subject. Here
the author wishes to draw attention to two sets of conclusions that were
reached in different papers. Based on Abedian and Standish's report for
the Human Sciences Research Council (Abedian and Standish, 1989), the Trade
Union Research Project reported that the most prevalent causes of failure
of public works programmes were:
- they were seldom scaled to the magnitude of national manpower needs;
- they were often introduced in a fragmented and unsystematic way;
- they used inappropriate technology;
- they were introduced on an ad hoc basis and were not linked to an
overall development policy;
- they had also failed because of the lack of administrative back-up;
- there had been inadequate post project maintenance;
- they were almost entirely dependent upon the government's commitment to
the programme: if there was a lack of commitment this would be
reflected in a lack of funding.
In their review of international special public works programmes, the
Trade Union Research Project concluded that there were certain problems,
these included:
- the conflict between sufficient planning and the need to start a
programme quickly and use donor investment funds speedily: a
programming stage of six months should be introduced;
- local institutions often have difficulty in taking responsibility for
execution of the projects: governments must allocate adequate human
resources to the projects;
- there is often not enough active participation by local beneficiaries.
It is also worth stressing the proportion of government expenditures
which have been devoted to public (relief) works programmes in the past.
According to Abedian and Standish (1985) between 1920 and 1940 the
proportion of government expenditure on unemployment relief measures varied
from 0,6% in 1920 to 15,8% in 1935; in only the first two years, 1920 and
1921, was the proportion lower than 1,7%. In the case of the USA it has
been reported elsewhere that:
Unemployment relief, aid to agriculture and public works designed to
promote employment together account for $26.0 billions, or nearly 50
per cent of the total federal expenditures in 1934-40.
(Hansen, 1941: 124)
A major conclusion that the author has reached about the vast majority
of public sector job creation schemes elsewhere in the world is that they
have generally concentrated upon "job creation" with little concern for
either the quality of the product or the economic efficiency of the work.
(As we will see the same has been true for similar programmes in South
Africa.) In most emergency job creation schemes there has been no interest
in the quality of the product and little concern for the economic
efficiency of the work. In relation to the South African government's
efforts to solve the poor white problem during the 1920s and 1930s Abedian
and Standish (1985) have quoted a 1920/1 Forestry Department report which
exemplifies the extent to which these programmes operated inefficiently:
The cost of these settlements proved to be very high indeed ..,
The costly nature of the work hardly justified the settlements from
the economic and purely forestry point of view, but from the social
standpoint the Department of White Labour is well satisfied.
More recent examples will be mentioned below.
This tendency to concentrate on employment creation at the expense of
concern for the quality and cost of the product may be seen within a UN
agency. In 1969 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) established
its World Employment Programme. Within this programme there were two
divisions: Special Public Works, and Technology and Employment. The
former was a much larger operation than the latter. Special Public Works
devoted its energies to emergency job creation, while Technology and
Employment concentrated upon the production of a good product by methods
that employed as many people as possible in an economically efficient
manner. Over the years there was increasing dissatisfaction with the lack
of quality and high cost of the Special Public Works Programmes. In 1987
the two divisions were amalgamated so that the dual perspective of the
Technology and Employment Branch could be brought to bear on the ILO's much
larger Special Public Works division.
Much of the author's experience was derived from his association with
the Technology and Employment Branch. Through this work he became
convinced that the use of labour-intensive methods during the construction
of infrastructure was economically efficient and could alleviate
unemployment. However, this can only be achieved with the adoption of a
dual perspective that lays as much emphasis upon the product as upon
employment. In the following section a summary will be given of the
theoretical principles on which this approach is based and the work carried
out in Africa.
THE POTENTIAL FOR EMPLOYMENT IN CONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
LABOUR-INTENSIVE CONSTRUCTION
During the 20th Century civil construction in industrialised countries
became highly capital-intensive. Conventionally the bulk of civil
construction is carried out using heavy equipment and only a small
proportion of the total costs are devoted to labour (about 10% for a
typical road project). During the 1970s and 1980s extensive research was
carried out by the World Bank and the International Labour Organisation to
explore the possibilities of employment creation within economies that were
neither industrialised nor expanding. The research concentrated upon civil
construction (physical infrastructure such as roads, dams, buildings) for
three reasons:
(i) Civil construction accounted for 50-70% of Gross Fixed Capital
Formation (Gross Fixed Investment) i.e. civil construction was
important in the development process as it produced the
infrastructure required for other investment to piosper;
(ii) 60-70% of civil construction took place within the public sector and
might, therefore, be amenable to public sector control;
(iii) 50% of civil construction consisted of earthworks which comprised the
following operations: excavation, load, haul, unload, spread
(2LHUS). ELHUS operations could be carried out by labour-intensive
methods as opposed to conventional equipment-intensive methods which
were merely magnified versions of hand-tools. Because earthworks
comprise such a large proportion of road construction (and road
construction comprises about half of all civil construction) if
labour could be substituted for equipment then there was an
opportunity for employment creation within economies that were not
expanding rapidly.
There is an extensive literature on the subject to which the author
has contributed and summarised elsewhere (McCutcheon, November 1990). For
the purposes of this paper only a few central issues will be sketched. The
first two phases of the research revealed that it was technically feasible
to substitute labour for equipment in civil construction and, under certain
circurastances, it was economically efficient to do so. In 1986 the World
Bank concluded:
Wherever the basic wage actually paid .,. is less than ,.. about US
$4,00 per day in 1982 prices, and labour is available in adequate
quantities, the alternative of using labour-intensive techniques
should be seriously considered (World Bank, 1986).
Four dollars in 1982 translates to between R27 and B38 in 1991 depending
upon various assumptions.
Economic efficiency was achieved through:
(i) proper analysis of the project and the methods of work used;
(ii) training of the supervisors;
(iii) good conditions of employment and the structuring of incentives;
(iv) good organisation and management;
(v) the use of appropriate good quality tools;
(vi) proper nutrition.
From this research the following view emerged: employment creation in
construction may be achieved through the use of labour-intensive methods of
construction. Labour-intensive construction may be defined as the
economically efficient employment of as great a proportion of labour as is
technically feasible, to produce as high a standard of construction as
demanded by the specification and allowed by the funding available.
Employment creation programmes based on the principles of labour-intensive
work aim at devoting as high a proportion of programme costs to unskilled
and semi-skilled labour without jeopardizing the required technical
standard of the product. Value for money is achieved by the intensive use
of labour often using innovative techniques of work, motivation and
control. Labour-intensive construction is the effective substitution of
labour for equipment. This substitution results in a quantum leap in the
amount of labourers required for civil construction.
The third phase of the research concentrated upon single-site, later
multi-site, exploration of the viability of the approach particularly in
relation to rural road construction. Over the past 17 years labour-
intensive road construction has progressed from being a hypothetical
possibility to a practical reality (Coukis et al., 1983). National
programmes have been established in Kenya (de Veen, 1980), Botswana
(McCutcheon, 1983; August 1988(a); May 1991), Lesotho (Hagen, 1986),
Malawi (Hagen and Relf, 1988) and Mozambique (Boardman, 1984) . Several
pilot projects are underway in Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Tanzania and
Zambia.
In Kenya, over 8 000 kilometres (kms) of rural access roads have been
constructed and over 80 000 years of employment have been created. The
Now discontinued because of the war.
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Ministry of Transport and Communications but operates within the national
District Focus policy which gives great autonomy to the local level. The
methods have been considered so successful that they have been introduced
in the secondary roads network (the Minor Roads Programme). In Botswana a
national programme of labour-intensive road construction units has been set
up within District Councils which are semi-autonomous bodies under the
overall responsibility of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands. This
programme has resulted in the creation of over 3 000 jobs (total employment
within the public sector is only 20 000) and the construction and upgrading
of nearly 2 000 kms of road. In Malawi the programme is part of the
Ministry of Works and Supply. Since it inception over 3 845 kms of
district road have been upgraded in 16 of the country's 24 districts. In
Lesotho the Labour Construction Unit has been attached to the Ministry of
Works since 1977. By 1985 about US $3 350 000 had been expended on various
construction works.
Thus, within different institutional and organisational frameworks, a
wide range of techniques of labour-intensive road construction and
maintenance have been extensively tried and tested over the past 17 years.
Local variations have resulted in experience under climatic conditions
varying from arid to tropical; terrain conditions varying from flat to
mountainous; traffic conditions varying from one to fifty vehicles per
day; standards varying from spot-improvement to engineered gravel roads
and haulage varying from tipper truck to donkey cart - the latter being
used in relation to the engineered earth roads. These methods of work have
been carried out within institutional frameworks that have varied from a
Department of Roads within a Ministry of Transport, to a Roads Unit within
a District Council that was semi-autonomous from a Ministry of Local
Government and Lands.
In the early phases the emphasis was upon the creation of employment
opportunities for unskilled labour. Over the past decade it has become
clear that in order to use labour productively it is necessary to train a
skilled supervisor who is technically and organisationally competent and
thus able to direct and motivate the workers under his or her control. (In
Kenya the ratio of labourers to site-supervisors is about 70 to 1; in
Botswana it is about 20 to 1.) Equally, for a successful national
programme it is necessary to educate engineers about employment creation
and train them in the specific skills required for the planning, control
and evaluation of large labour-intensive programmes (to date the ratio is
about one engineer per 300 labourers; in time an experienced technician or
technologist should be able to do this level of work releasing the engineer
for engineering and planning).
The author considers that the main reasons for the success of the
programmes in Kenya and Botswana are as follows:
(i) Good preliminary analytical work and thorough attention to technical
aspects throughout the work;
(ii) Pilot projects which tested all aspects (technical, administrative,
organisational, institutional, wage rates and conditions of
employment, training, planning, socio-economic\community) and acted
as the embryonic training programme for future work;
(iii) Strong organisations/institutions with good management systems: yet
flexible;
(iv) Extensive training;
(v) Long-term political support;
(vi) Long-term financial commitment;
(vii) Good long-term co-ordination and objective external advice;
(viii) Consensus reached with regard to: wage rates, conditions of
employment, role and responsibilities of the community.
(McCutcheon, November 1990)
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA
Most of the above experience has been achieved in relation to the
construction and maintenance of low-cost low-volume rural roads. On his
return to South Africa the author explored the extent to which the success
of the programmes in Kenya and Botswana could be replicated in South
Africa. The author initially assumed that replication would only be
feasible in rural areas because of the ostensible differences between South
Africa and the other two countries; in particular (i) South Africa was far
more industrialised and thus heavy equipment was readily available together
with the operation and maintenance systems for achieving high productivity
and (ii) the complex nature of political and labour relations (McCutcheon,
August 1988(b)). Subsequent experience with conditions in South Africa has
led the author to conclude that labour-intensive methods should be viable
on a much wider scale and for other sub-sectors besides rural road
construction. On the one hand the dislocation between the industrialised
portions of South Africa and the remainder of the country is so great that
it should be possible for labour-intensive methods to be economically
efficient for much urban road construction. On the other hand, in relation
to the provision of municipal infrastructure (streets, water supply,
sewerage and stormwater drainage) in Hinge (Transkei) and Soweto,
significant pathbreaking progress has been made and documented by the
consulting firm Croswell, Shepherd and Partners (Croswell, 1986; 1989).
Furthermore, one contractor has reported success in using labour-intensive
methods (Loots, 1989).
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A cursory analysis of the extent to which labour-intensive methods
might be used in the earthworks component of civil construction was carried
out by the author {McCutcheon, March 1989). This analysis would need
refinement before it could provide an objective basis for predicting the
order of magnitude of work that could be created and thus set criteria for
achievement. The cursory assessment of the earthworks component of civil
construction work undertaken within a part of the public sector indicated
that the numbers of people employed in civil construction could be doubled.
If this analysis of only a part of the public sector were to hold true for
the whole industry, there would be employment opportunities for not less
than 100 000 people.
Although research would be required to determine the number of
employment opportunities that could be created, the author proposed that a
strategy should be adopted in order to increase the greater use of local
resources, particularly labour, in the construction industry. This
strategy was based upon the experience and research outlined earlier in the
paper:
(i) The adoption of a long term (+ 10 years) national perspective,
(ii) The identification of the type of work which could incorporate
greater use of local resources.
(iii) Analysis of the extent to which local resources might be used within
the types of work identified in (ii).
(iv) The need for a "programme" approach: firstly, achieve consensus
amongst the various parties involved as to the concepts involved and
overall objectives; secondly, detailed analysis of all aspects of
the proposed work; thirdly, initiate a small pilot project which
would also be the embryonic training programme, concurrently carry
out further analytical and forward planning work and fourthly embark
upon soundly structured national programmes.
(v) Educate all involved in this work about the concepts and means for
achieving the objectives.
More details of the proposed strategy have been provided elsewhere
(McCutcheon, February 1991).
With one exception there has been little progress in relation to the
implementation of the proposed strategy. The remainder of the paper will
outline the difficulties that have been experienced in relation to the
initiation and implementation of employment creation in construction in
South Africa.
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intensive methods but the cost of the works would then be 20% higher than
using conventional methods. However, the decision to actually make use of
labour-intensive methods was taken after the design has been completed. At
this stage the Engineer attempted to influence the construction methods
used by the prospective contractors.
Several statements and instructions specifying the use of labour-
intensive methods were scattered throughout the tender documents, viz:
(i) A clause in the Special Conditions of Contract emphasized the
"importance of using economically viable labour-intensive methods of
construction wherever possible";
(ii) A clause in the specification stated that "Preference will be given
to tenders which provide for the use, wherever feasible of labour-
intensive construction methods". The clause also listed work and
operations that should be considered for labour-intensive work, e.g.
clearing, gribbing, removal of trees, hard excavation, spreading
backfill, pipe laying, etc.
(iii) A direction to the Tenderer to price the Schedule of Quantities on
the basis of methods normally used by his firm but that "special
consideration will be given to firms who offer labour-intensive
methods wherever possible";
(iv) A schedule in which the Tenderer was required to detail all work
normally carried out by labour-intensive methods at billed rates;
(v) A schedule in which the Tenderer was required to detail activities
normally carried out with equipment but which could alternatively be
undertaken by hand labour, together wi th the time and cost
implications of the use of hand labour;
(vi) A schedule of rates was required for the hire of plant and a schedule
listing plant which would be made available for the contract.
Although there appear to be several points at which the Engineer was
attempting to foster the use of labour-intensive methods, the construction
specification was based strictly upon the conventional specifications which
are related to the use of equipment (SABS 1200 DB Earthworks (Pipelines)
and LB Pipe Bedding). No provisions were omitted, altered or included to
facilitate the use of labour-intensive methods. Furthermore, despite the
Engineer's avowed commitment to the greater use of labour-intensive methods
phrases like "wherever possible" and "wherever feasible" did not compel the
Tenderer to use labour-intensive methods. The inclusion of another
schedule requiring "details of operations normally done with equipment but
which could be carried out by labour if instructed to do so" acknowledged
the Engineer's belief that labour would be more costly and time-consuming
than plant. The list of plant and plant-hire rates contradicted the
intention to promote labour-intensive methods.
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PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED IN RELATION TO EMPLOYMENT CREATION IN CONSTRUCTION
In relation to employment creation in construction several
organisations and institutions are debating the issues, developing policies
and implementing projects. These include:
(i) The Development Bank of Southern Africa;
(ii) Institutions within Kwazulu, Transkei and Venda;
(iii) COSATU;
(iv) The government;
(v) Old Mutual-Nedcor;
(vi) Soweto City Engineer's Department
(vii) Urban Foundation.
(viii) The Independent Development Trust
The author has been directly involved in various projects in which
employment creation has been a major focus. He has also been involved to a
lesser degree in other projects or initiatives. Through these activities
he has become acquainted with other projects and has been able to observe
progress. Under these three di fferent categories of involvement, the
following table lists the projects and the responsible organisation:
1. DIRECT INVOLVEMENT (EXTENSIVE)
Project/Programme
Transkei Rural Road Network
Kwazulu Tribal Roads Maintenance
Study
Xolo Road
Programme of Labour-based
Construction Assignment Projects
Mohlaletsi Sekhukhuneland
Organisation
Transkei/DBSA
Kwazulu/DBSA
Kwazulu/DBSA
DBSA
Department of History University of
the Witwatersrand, Donaldson Trust
2. DIRECT INVOLVEMENT (LIMITED)
"Towards 1 million Jobs"
Imbali Rehabilitation
Gini Upgrading
Venda Tribal Roads Maintenance
Upgrading of Primary Teacher
Training Colleges Transkei
Department of Transport
COSATU
Joint Working Committee
Urban Foundation
Venda/DBSA
Transkei/DBSA
Civil Engineering Advisory Committee
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3. OTHER PROJECTS
Upgrading of Secondary Water Mains
in Soweto Soweto/Croswell
Hinge Upgrading Ilinge/Croswell
Etwatwa Stormwater Daveyton/BKS
Bridges in Bophuthatswana BOP/Jeffares & Green
Mkomazi Bridge Kwazulu/DBSA
Macubeni Dam Transkei
T.A.T.U. Roads T.A.T.U. Transkei
Thokoza Road Valley Trust
Particularly through direct involvement but also from observation of
other work, the author has identified several problem areas associated with
employment creation in construction. However, before discussion of the
problem areas it is necessary to describe the most common process that has
been traditionally followed in the provision of construction
infrastructure. Without an understanding of the conventional construction
process it would be difficult to appreciate what is entailed in attempting
to alter the components of such a process.
The conventional process involves three distinct parties. The client
(public sector authority or private company) decides that something must be
built. The client is formally referred to as the Employer. The Employer
appoints a consulting engineer (the Engineer) to design the work and
prepare the contract documents covering the construction work. Once the
design has been completed and the contract documentation prepared the work
is put out to tender. Contractors submit their tenders. The contract is
awarded to the contractor who submits the lowest tender. The contractor
constructs the works. The work of the contractor is usually checked by the
consultant (the Engineer) who designed the works.
The Client may be public sector or private. In most countries the
public sector is Client for approximately 60-70% of all civil engineering
work. The function of the Engineer may be carried out "in-house" (i.e.
within the client organisation whether public or private) or by a separate
consulting engineering firm; whichever, the Engineer is still required to
be competent as to design and impartial with respect to supervision of
construction works. The works themselves may be constructed by an "in-
house'1 capacity (termed departmental work or force account) or separate
contracting companies. In recent years the balance of work between
departmental and contracting companies has been about 30:70 (Lagaay, 1989),.
While there are several circumstances under which different procedures
are followed the above is the most common, particularly in relation to the
provision of civil infrastructure. The first point to make is the number
of different organisations involved in the process and, therefore, if one
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wishes to initiate something out of the ordinary, one has to persuade
people in different organisations to see things differently. The second is
that, if one wishes to initiate something different it begins with the
client.
Thirdly, over the past thirty years civil construction has been based
upon the use of equipment. Clients have certain expectations as to the
type of product they require and the methods by which these will be
provided. Consultants have developed designs which make optimum use of
equipment and the specifications for testing quality of results are also
equipment based; similarly for the contract documentation. Consultants
tend to specialise in designing certain types of work. They are able to
make a living by the modification of earlier work. The fee structure is
laid down by the South African Association of Consulting Engineers. As
long as any new work is merely a modification of earlier work the
consultants can survive. However, if there is a significant difference in
the new work then the existing fee structure does not cover the time and
effort required to investigate the technical requirements, design
accordingly and produce appropriate contract documentation (Cohen, 1989).
Equally, the contractor has developed systems based upon the use of
equipment. On the one hand he has the skilled human resources to manage
and operate this equipment. On the other, he is able to assess the time,
cost and technical implications of the new work for which he has been asked
to tender. These aspects will be dealt with in much greater detail below.
The outline of the construction process has been provided because it
will be necessary to make reference to it when discussing problems. It
should also have indicated that the construction of civil infrastructure is
a process requiring the co-operation of different parties each of whom has
different priorities. To achieve a fundamental change in the way things
are done requires much more than a measure of common understanding on the
part of the different parties. In relation to a significantly greater use
of labour in the construction process it is necessary that the client
understands that he will get the same quality of product for the same cost,
within the same time frame as could be achieved using equipment. The
consultant must be able to develop designs and contract documentation
appropriate to the greater use of labour and have mechanisms for checking
the results. The contractor must have the human resources (skilled
supervisors) and management systems for implementation.
As mentioned above the construction process is based upon the use of
equipment, A corollary is that it is not based upon the extensive use of
labour. To incorporate a significant increase in the use of labour
requires a complete revision of the components of the construction process
from conception through design and specification to construction itself.
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This would include the necessary training of the engineering and
supervisory personnel.
Turning now to the problem areas identified during the past four
years, these will be dealt with under several headings:
1. Overall misconceptions.
2. Emergency job creation projects,
3. The Contractor.
4. Analysis and Design.
5. Lead-in time (Consensus/start-up phase).
6. Long-term perspective.
7. "Programme" Approach.
8. Community.
9. Small Contractors and the Public Sector.
10. Wages, Conditions of Service and Trades Unions.
1. Overall Miaconcentions
Clients, consulting engineers, contractors, donors, officials and
community representatives are usually extremely sceptical as to the
practicality of this type of work with respect to time, cost, quality and
organisation. It is generally contended that labour-intensive methods
would be more costly, take longer and result in a lower quality of product
than could be achieved using equipment; organization of the work force
would be far more difficult, especially with the current level of conflict.
Discussions reveal psychological dimensions: engineers and client
officials dislike labour-intensive methods because they are not modern and
because they are perceived as being primitive and backward. In turn
community representatives think that the use of such "third class" methods
must mean that a third class product is being foisted upon them. These
misconceptions were experienced by the author throughout his work in Iran,
Botswana and Kenya. The same ^et of misconceptions has been identified in
South Africa by James Croswell who calls them 'lies' (Croswell, 1989).
TIi* research and practical work carried out elsewhere challenge each
of these misconceptions: as discussed above, labour-intensive construction
results in the same quality of product at an economically efficient cost
(see above pages 6 and 7). The international experience has been
substantiated during the provision of municipal infrastructure in South
Africa {Croswell, 1986; 1990). Despite the evidence to the contrary it
would be fair to say that most engineers remain sceptical as to time, cost,
quality and labour relations. Labour-intensive construction is still
regarded as heretical by the civil engineering industry. These
misconceptions, taken together with a lack of understanding of the
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construction process, are probably a major source of most of the problems
areas which are discussed below.
2. Emergency Job Creation
Perhaps the most serious consequence of the misconceptions is the
common perception that the greater use of labour could only be sensible in
relation to emergency job creation projects. The belief that the greater
use of labour automatically implies greater cost, longer construction
times, lower quality and difficulties with the management of labour means
that those involved in emergency job creation projects have low
expectations which are indeed mirrored by results.
However, to the layman the methods used during emergency job creation
projects are ostensibly the same as labour-intensive methods:
predominantly individuals using hand tools. It is not understood that
individuals milling around without any visible order or engineering is NOT
labour-intensive construction: to the contrary most emergency job creation
projects are labour-ejttensive with little to show in the way of product.
But the misconceptions lead to principles of analysis, planning and
engineering being ignored. It is worth dealing with the most recent local
example of this in greater detail.
The Special Employment Creation Programme (SECP) was initiated in
1985. The objective of the SECP was "to provide temporary relief to the
unemployed but to refrain from giving them handouts, and to deploy them as
productively as possible". From April 1985 to June 1990 R719 million was
spent on the SECP. In addition a Training Programme was attached to the
SECP: from the initiation of the programme in 1985 until June 1990 R423
million was spent on training {in building skills not civil construction)
In 1987 the Development Bank of Southern Africa evaluated the early
stages of the SECP (Viljoen et al. , 1987). It reported that up to March
1986 297 867 people had been employed in temporary jobs. In its assessment
it noted that:
- the SECP was of too short a duration and the amount of money too small
to make any significant impact;
- in some cases supervision and administration was difficult which led to
poor productivity;
- there was a lack of clarity;
- project identification was haphazard;
- there were time lags- in cash payments to institutions.
The development of the SECP since 1986 has not yet been systematically
evaluated, however a DBSA commentator recently reported that both short-
term temporary projects and longer term projects had been incorporated into
the SECP since 1985 (Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, 1991). The results of the
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SECP were held to correlate with international experience; for projects
with short-term and temporary results:
- no permanent employment opportunities were created;
- no physical and social infrastructural assets were created;
- projects were not fully integrated with development programmes;
- projects were inadequately planned, designed, co-ordinated and
implemented;
- institutional capacities were inadequate to deal with short-term
programmes in addition to normal activities;
- in some instances permanent workers were replaced by temporary workers.
Projects with a long-term and permanent nature had contributed to the
creation of permanent employment opportunities and physical and social
infrastructure.
No evidence was provided of the balance of expenditure between the
short-term and permanent aspects of the programme. Neither was any
evidence provided to indicate that, even in the permanent projects, per
unit of expenditure more employment had been created than would
conventionally have been the case. (From the arguments presented in this
paper the author suspects this to have been improbable.) Nonetheless
Kritzinger-Van Niekerk derived one important lesson from the analysis of
the SECP from 1985 to 1990:
the scarce management and financial resources of the public sector
could be inefficiently and ineffectively allocated if programmes
were to be regarded as special, separate and in addition to normal
public programmes.
This is an important point. The World Bank has stressed the importance of
institutional development in relation to successful labour-intensive road
construction (Cook et al., 1985).
Despite its title the SECP was not a programme but a number of unco-
ordinated projects. . The lack of a properly conceived and executed
programme was its major weakness. The overwhelming impression of the SECP
is of its cursory, temporary, unplanned and haphazard nature. In part this
stems from the political nature of the programme: to provide emergency
employment to reduce the level of violence. In part the very nature of
poorly planned emergency job creation focussing upon the provision of
temporary job opportunities meant that very little of substance could
result.
But other points need to be made. The promoters of the programme
repeatedly stressed employment creation and the labour-intensive nature of
the work. In fact temporary employment opportunities were provided but the
work itself was not labour-intensive. As we will see below it could not
possibly have been, given the lack of knowledge base, the lack of lead-in
time, the lack of training in civil construction and the overall lack of
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planning. Where civil work was attempted it would have been by essentially
conventional methods or by labour-extensive methods i.e. extremely
inefficient. However, the normal engineer and administrator has shown
inadequate knowledge of this subject and such low expectations of manual
work that the poor results did not surprise them and they had no idea how
to improve the situation. Thus the unfortunate connotation between
"labour-intensive" and "low productivity, low standards, difficult to
manage" added to the lack of appreciation of the need to plan and engineer
the work properly. Over the past four years the majority of the so-called
labour-intensive work has been labour-ej£tensive emergency job creation:
very little of worth has been produced by highly inefficient means. Of
equal concern is the fact that the disorganised nature of the projects, the
low quality of the product and the expense have reinforced the prejudices
of those who are against labour-intensive construction.
3. The Contractor
Some organisations have endeavoured to promote greater use of labour-
intensive methods. The first attempts to increase the use of labour
consisted of putting the onus upon the contractor to utilise more labour.
The contract documentation contained exhortatory remarks to the effect that
the contractor should make greater use of labour "wherever feasible". One
project in Transkei was described as being built using labour-intensive
methods. In the event, a mere R45 000 for a labour-only component was
tacked onto a R7 000 000 project, the rest of which was carried out
entirely by conventional means (although in the same town, the same
contractor was using more local resource intensive methods on another
project).
Some idea of the difficulties of introducing the greater use of labour
at the design stage may be gained from a particular project (the following
example is taken from Cohen, 1989). The construction of a sewer by labour-
intensive methods was seen as a means of employment creation within a town
and (even) of general upliftment within a region. (The fact that labour-
intensive construction of a sewer was seen as leading to general upliftment
of a region is an example of a common misconception among engineers as to
the economic and social contribution which may reasonably be expected of
construction as a whole and labour-intensive construction in particular),
The consultant (the Engineer) made strenuous representations to the
regional authority (the Employer) to the effect that labour-intensive
construction was "a good thing" (it was argued that funds expended in the
provision of infrastructure should remain within the populace through the
use of labour intensive methods). Initially the Engineer categorically
told the Employer and Project Manager that he could design for labour-
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Only conventional contractors answered advertised invitations to
tender. The tender results indicated that the contractors did not
seriously investigate the extent to which the Engineer's exhortations could
be realised in practice. For example, when asked to list all labour-
intensive items allowed for in the tender, the following descriptions were
received:
(i) "All pipe laying, manholes, fittings and certain sections of shallow
excavation to locate existing services. All bedding to be handled
manually."
(ii) "Al 1 items that-, a machine cannot dn +30 local labourers to be
employed."
(iii) "Part of all excavation, backfill and compaction. Manhole building.
Pipe laying."
(iv) "All excavation in easily pickable material and laying of all pipes
and fittings."
(v) "Spreading bedding and blanket material. All labour on manholes,
etc. Machines to lift pre-cast sections. All hand labour which will
not be done bv machines."
(vi) "fCompany X' guarantee to employ on a full-time basis 20 local
labourers at current rates." (Emphasis added by author.)
It may be seen that the Tenderers had little intention of seriously
using labour-intensive methods. No blame can be attached to them, however,
because the project had not been designed from the outset to be done
labour-intensively and the contract documentation showed that the Engineer
had only attempted to influence matters by exhortation.
In the evaluation of tenders the Engineer made passing reference to
labour-intensive considerations but these had no bearing on their
recommendations (in which they listed plant and plant hire rates). Phase 1
awarded to the abovementioned 'Company X' who, using plant, took a year to
complete the contract works which had been scheduled as being of six months
duration. Phase 3 was subsequently awarded to another contractor who
intended to use equipment to construct the sewers.
From this sewer project it may be seen that, despite the good
intentions of the Engineer and the Employer, it was not possible to achieve
greater use of labour-intensive methods by tacking on a codicil,
encouraging the use of labour, to a conventional contract document. Nor
did token attempts to include labour-intensive methods "wherever feasible"
or "wherever possible" have anything other than a token response from the
contractors. Greater use of labour-intensive methods cannot be achieved on
a project that has been designed to be carried out using equipment.
The construction process militates against incorporation of greater
use of labour-intensive methods at the construction stage. Attempts to
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achieve greater use of labour at the contractual stage overlook the nature
of the construction process. The design, specifications, contract
documentation and procedures were all oriented towards the use of
conventional equipment based methods. Exhortation could not change matters
one jot. The decision to use labour-intensive methods has to be taken
prior to the construction stage and then fully integrated into the design
and construction process.
4. Vrfllvsis and Design
The first response to the need to increase the productive use of
labour had been to expect this to be achievable through the contractor.
For those engineers who realise that the process has to start earlier other
problems arise.
For long-term success in relation to proper employment creation,
analysis and design are crucial elements that require detailed attention.
There is an almost complete lack of appreciation of the need for such
preparatory analytical work. Here there is a confusion between the civil
and the building construction industries. It is not usually realised that
building is already a labour-intensive activity; while additional work can
be created simply by providing more funds, little more work will be created
per unit of expenditure. In the construction of buildings the focus should
be on maintaining the labour content: there is scope for increasing the
labour content in the production of building materials* Furthermore, it is
not necessary to initiate special training programmes requiring the
development of new training material for building construction. In the
building industry all the technical and training details have been worked
out. The opposite is true for civil construction. In recent decades all
operations have been equipment based. Transformation to the use of labour
requires detailed analytical investigations followed by thorough training
programmes to create the necessary supervisors who can set out, organise
and monitor the work carried out by their labourers.
This state of affairs is exacerbated by the lack of appreciation of
the magnitude of the employment creation potential in construction. Even
professionals who are sympathetic to the idea are unaware that in relation
to bulk earthworks labour-intensive construction means a 200-500% increase
in the use of labour per unit of expenditure.
In conventional road construction the normal proportion of costs
allocated to labour is about 10%. Experience elsewhere indicates that for
rural road construction this proportion may be increased to 65%, i.e. if a
rural road cost R100 000 per kilometre using conventional methods R10 000
would go to labour but through labour-intensive methods this could be
increased (by 550%) to R65 000, for the same quality of product. For a
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high standard road Rl 000 000 per kiloaetre is a reasonable figure. Of
this 10% (R100 000) would go to labour if built by conventional methods.
Limited theoretical work indicates that this could be raised to 35%
(R350 000), again for the same quality of product. While this has yet to
be proven in practice for a major road, the estimates reveal a significant
order of magnitude of increase in employment creation per unit of
expenditure. However, it is only in rural road construction that the
analytical work has been done in sufficient detail to enable the
establishment of reasonable bench marks. In other sub-sectoral work (dams,
streets, storm water, water supply, sewerage, irrigation) the analytical
work has not been done which could indicate the upper limits of employment
creation.
Even sympathetic engineers tend to think only of a marginal increase
(10-20%). This low level of expectation hinders their recognition of the
need for detailed investigatory work. It also hinders recognition of the
magnitude of the task. The 10-20% view leads to an add-on approach which
has little impact upon employment creation.
Another distortion which fits under this category is also a result of
the lack of analytical work. Within a small circle mainly related to
development work, there has recently been a sudden increase in interest in
labour-intensive work, particularly as there is the realisation that donors
are willing to provide funding. The author has seen proposals for
supposedly labour-intensive work which on inspection reveal that the same
proportion of expenditure has been allocated to labour as in a conventional
design. Although labelled "labour-intensive" it is not so. A fashionable
title has been appended to a conventional design. Yet it is difficult for
an employer or donor organisation to detect this sleight of hand. The
criteria do not exist whereby a knowledgeable person could decide whether
the proposal has resulted in a significant increase in the proportion of
expenditure devoted to labour. In the meantime the internal assessor is
probably unable to detect that the proposal contains little other than
pious words.
The time and effort required for the analysis and design of labour-
intensive construction is significant. The following example (taken from
Cohen, 1989) describes in some detail the verbiage used in relation to
development work (the equivalent for the consultant of the exhortatory
remarks for the contractor detailed above) and the consultant's dilemma in
responding to the demands.
A major regional development project has the stated objective "to
raise, with the full participation of the loc&J communities, the standard
of life of the people in the Durban/Pietermaritzburg area through the
22
promotion of Economic Development in its broadest sense ,..". Development
guidelines stated, inter alia,
"There must be full involvement of the local community"
"... local inhabitants must acquire their rightful share in the
economy"
"The locals must become employers, not only employees"
"Money spent on projects must as far as possible be channelled into
the pockets of the local communities"*
In order to encourage and draw local entrepreneurs into the economy it was
postulated that labour-intensive methods of construction should be utilized
to reduce the amount of capital required to undertake construction works.
This thinking was reinforced by other statements in the consultants brief
such as
"... balanced approach with priority tending to small scale,
informal, traditional and rural sectors" and
"Although the importance of outside expertise is acknowledged,
opportunities should be created for local participation and
involvement (the creation of employment is not the main
consideration, but rather that local people should have the
opportunity to advance to managerial positions and participate as
entrepreneurs.)"
In addition it was stated that in order to meet these objectives and
guidelines, the individual projects would have to be broken into small sub-
projects within the capabilities of local entrepreneurs and be designed in
such a way that their lack of capital and experience would not be a barrier
to participation in the development programme.
However, the consulting engineer faced a serious dilemma (Cohen,
1989). Most consultants think only in terms of conventional designs within
the conventional construction process outlined above. Despite staff
shortages, work overloads, severe time and internal budget constraints,
they have developed systems for quickly producing designs, drawings and
contract documentation. These systems have evolved over years of dealing
with similar projects to the point that, within existing formalised fee
structures, the consultant has developed office standards and can produce
the requisite designs, make a profit and stay in business.
For example, by utilizing a standard method of measurement to prepare
a schedule of quantities and by cannibalizing parts from different contract
documents and using SABS 1200 as the specification, a tender document can
be prepared within a few days of the preliminary drawings being produced.
This whole system is geared towards conventional (capital-intensive)
construction. And from past experience the consultant is able to estimate
costs and construction times fairly easily. The design incorporates the
method of construction.
Consultants Brief, 1989.
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However, basic documentation does not yet exist for labour-intensive
work; SABS 1200 (the standard specifications) only exist for capital-
intensive methods. The dilemma was that the consultant interested in
increasing the labour content did not have the experience, time or
resources to re-think the entire design and construction process. Neither
did the consultant have the resources to design a contract strategy to deal
with the vagaries of the informal sector and small building contractors.
If the design were based on the use of equipment, the consultant (the
Engineer) would merely have to advertise the tender and would be sure to
receive tenders from five to six contractors each willing to provide surety
bonds, guarantees, insurance and capable of working to specification with
minimal supervision. By contrast the development of labour-intensive
construction using small contractors was seen as a continual battle: the
design phase, the community participation struggle, contract documentation,
attempting to find small local contractors and then training them to
actually carry out the construction. The consultant would also find
himself in the position of project manager (possibly without adequate
remuneration) or even have to provide bridging finance to procure materials
and pay small contractors every fortnight. All these problems were
considered demotivators in the implementation of labour-intensive methods
(Cohen, 1989). From this detailed description of a Consultant's views we
see that the use of labour-intensive methods not only has to be integrated
into the design stage and contract strategy but requires dedication on the
part of the Consultant to overcome the demotivators presented by the method
in these early stages of application.
Recently, led by one consultant, James Croswell, there has been some
recognition of the need to incorporate the concepts of labour-intensive
construction into the feasibility analysis (project report stage), the
design and contract preparation stage and the construction process
(Croswell, 1989(a), (b), (c)). The work was initiated for municipal
infrastructure in Hinge, Transkei and has been refined during the
replacement of secondary water mains in Soweto. The progress has been
achieved by the consultant engineer becoming the project manager and
undertaking a host of tasks not normally carried out by the consultant.
These tasks have included (i) the identification and training of potential
contractors, (ii) development of appropriate designs, contract procedures
and documentation, (iii) direct supervision of construction and (iv) direct
control of materials. (DBSA, 1991)
This work has resulted in municipal infrastructure being produced in
financially efficient terms. Technical, contractual and organisational
lessons have been learned which would have to be integrated into a national
employment creation programme (greater attention would have to be paid to
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the bulk earthworks). But this particular group of consultants are in the
distinct minority. Croswell in particular has had to absorb considerable
criticism from both the consulting and contracting fraternities, Croswell
has also felt the full brunt of the need to carry out preparatory
analytical and design work.
Another important aspect of the requisite preliminary work for
innovation is its cost. The consultant has been blamed for excessive
charges. For the record, the overheads for the initial 3 years of the
Kenyan RARP amounted to 84%, however, over the whole programme they were
only 16% (Hagen, 1985).
5. Lead-i,n Time fConsejismg/jStart-up phase)
A significant lead-in time is required prior to wide-scale
implementation of this type of work. The lead-in time results from the
necessity for preparatory investigatory work, the need to train people to
execute the work in different ways and the necessity for detailed planning.
A significant lead-in time is also required in order to obtain the
consensus of all the parties involved as to the concept and implications of
the methods of construction. These parties include the government, the
different ministries concerned (public works, labour, regional planning,
legal), local authorities, local communities, trade unions, engineers. The
World Bank has recommended that where no previous experience exists a
start-up period of at least three years should be considered (World Bank,
1986). Please note that TURP (page 4) considered only six months to be
sufficient.
Even policy makers who are sympathetic towards labour-intensive
construction are reluctant to face the reality of the need for a lead-in
period. Policy makers who are only concerned about employment creation and
have little interest in the constructed product have even less appreciation
of the need for a start-up period. Whilst the author is aware of his lack
of competence in relation to psychological interpretation, frequent
exposure to these attitudes has led him to consider that one of the major
stumbling blocks is the perception that labour-intensive work is simple
work by simple people using simple tools and, therefore, there is no need
for sophisticated people to take the whole matter very seriously, i.e. no
need to plan.
6. A long-term perspective
The lead-in time is only one aspect of the need for a long-term
perspective in order to establish an employment creation programme. With
the absence of an institution devoted to employment creation it takes time
to establish one or adapt an existing institution. In relation to the
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establishment of road maintenance systems (based mainly on equipment-
intensive methods) the World Bank concluded that in no case had it taken
less than ten years to establish a functioning system (World Bank, 1981).
The Kenyan Rural Access Roads Programme was started in 1974, by 1977 it had
only constructed 250 kilometres yet by 1986 it had constructed 8 000
kilometres of rural road. It was only gradually incorporated into the
normal operations of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. In the
case of Botswana, after the first attempt, in 1974, to establish labour-
intensive road construction had gone sour, the Department of Roads
(Ministry of Works and Communications) refused to have anything to do with
these methods. Eventually the Ministry of Local Government and Lands
initiated a pilot project in 1980. In that year only 3 kilometres of road
were constructed and 20 people employed. It took until 1985 to establish a
national programme and by 1990 nearly 2 000 kilometres had been constructed
and over 3 000 people employed.
To date, in South Africa, only one programme has begun to develop a
long term perspective: the Kwazulu Tribal Roads Maintenance Study. This
perspective has failed to take root anywhere else.
7. A "programme" approach: institution ing
In relation to low-volume rural road construction several
organisations and administrations in South Africa have initiated pilot
projects or studies aimed at creating both unemployment and infrastructure
through the use of labour-intensive methods of construction and
maintenance. Projects have been carried out in Transkei (T.A.T.U. 1984/5;
1987; Solinjani et al. , 1989) and Kwazulu (Geddes, 1985; Little, 1987).
In each case considerable efforts have been expended on the part of the
engineers, officials and communities. However, these pilot projects have
resulted in little more than the construction of short stretches of road.
Because the projects have been implemented on an ad hoc basis as individual
projects they have remained isolated projects. All the lessons learned by
the officials, engineers and communities have remained with the individuals
concerned, as has any training in road building. The fault lies in the
fact that the projects were implemented in an institutional vacuum
(McCutcheon and Veldman, 1990). The pilot projects must be implemented
within an institutional framework that will ensure that the initial work is
fostered. In order to achieve this it is necessary to create a specific
institution or adapt an existing one. The World Bank recommends the latter
(Cook et al. , 1984). Either way it is certainly necessary to create the
human resources to implement the projects. This is only possible through
extensive training. This process can be used to build the institutional
framework.
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In the other African countries where national programmes now exist
success has been achieved through what the author has termed a "programme"
approach. This approach consists of four phases.
1. Preparatory (Consensus) phase
2. Analysis and Design phase
3. Pilot - initial training phase
4. Expanded training — national programme
The above approach has to be located within an institution, i.e. the
programme is not solely dependent upon a particular set of enthusiasts.
This approach links to the earlier discussion about the need for a
lead-in period. During the lead-in period phases 1 and 2 are carried out.
For the purposes of this paper it is not considered necessary to describe
in detai1 the components of the different phases, those interested are
referred to another paper (McCutcheon and Little, 1991). However, the
following list summarises the work required.
Phase One
Consensus on concept
Brief local and national authorities as to type, standard,
funding and method of construction; and importance of training,
institution (local and national), long-term political and
financial commitment.
Draft long-term programme.
Phase Two
Analysis: institution (national and local); levels of funding;
specific technical analyses; criteria for staffing;
identification of first community and training site.
Preparatory Work: Administrative, Technical and Training
Manuals, selection of staff, briefing of active community, revise
forward plans.
Phase Three
Orientation and training of Trainers.
Start Training Programme.
Revise Training and National Programmes.
Revise Manuals and Reporting System.
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Phase Four
Expand first training programme into a national programme. But
expansion should only be allowed to proceed
(i) at the rate at which the training programme can produce
skilled supervisors (the training programme must pay as
much attention to character as to technical and
organisational competence);
(ii) to the degree to which the national institution is able to
absorb the trained personnel and function at the local
level;
(iii) to the degree to which local communities are able to
organise themselves.
Through the "programme" (as opposed to project) approach the institution is
created together with the human resources required to implement the work
from site level through to national coordination.
8. Community
The role of the community was mentioned several times in the previous
section. This is a topic that deserves a paper on its own. A few comments
about community will be made in this section. Civil engineers by
definition are concerned with providing the physical infrastructure for
civil society. Within the formal structures that exist there is seldom
need to be directly involved with the community. In a sense the
community's wishes should have been accommodated before the involvement of
the engineer. The public sector Client should represent the formalised
will of the people with respect to physical infrastructure. While there
are innumerable instances of differences of opinion between the public
sector and the public, the engineer has operated at at least one remove
from the will of the public. Furthermore, within the formal construction
process engineers have been vigorously encouraged to distance themselves
from the political process in order to limit the possibilities of
corruption.
From such a perspective it would be fair to say that conventional
engineers have very little interaction with the community during their
working lives. Consequently engineers are usually extremely naive in their
understanding of communities. If they become involved in community
development work without prior experience many difficulties ensue which
quickly jeopardise the success of the work. What is the relevance of these
remarks to labour-intensive construction? Simply that most labour-
intensive construction requires good interaction with the community in
order to succeed.
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Conventional engineers have experienced difficulties relating to
communities elsewhere in Africa. And these difficulties were experienced
in places where local authority structures were legitimate and reasonably
clearly defined. In South Africa the situation is compounded by the lack
of legitimate local authorities. It becomes a major problem to define "the
community" and identify its legitimate representatives. This problem
cannot be overestimated.
As most conventional engineers are barely aware of the problem they
tend to be easily misled by the first so-called representative community
group with whom they came in contact. At this point I have watched several
"Saul on the road to Damascus" conversions in which a previously socially
ignorant engineer becomes obsessed by a simplistic belief in "the
community". Some engineers become aware of the social complexities. An
irony here is that sometimes these enlightened engineers become so involved
in the local politics that they become unable to do any engineering.
In relation to rural road construction the author has proposed
guidelines for local community participation (McCutcheon, June 1991).
There is no doubt that additional guidelines should be prepared for the
labour-intensive construction of municipal infrastructure. A major
implication for employment creation programmes is that proper consideration
of the community must take place during the lead-in time.
9. Small Contractors and the Public Sector
The creation of small contractors has a role to play in employment
creation. In Kenya the workers, on both the construction and maintenance
work, are employed on an individual contract basis. This process has been
carried still further in Ghana. Yet in South Africa the emphasis by
engineers and development institutions on the importance of the small
contractor steins in part from "free marketeer" views of the benefit of the
market and privatisation, and in part from a perspective that wants a
middle class to develop rapidly.
These views have led to high expectations regarding small contractors
whose work is based upon the use of labour-intensive methods. Several
projects have fostered their development (Croswell, 1986; 1989, 1991). The
author considers that these projects have attempted to achieve difficult
objectives: not only the use of labour-intensive methods but also the
abilities to run a company on a sound financial basis in an extremely
competitive environment. According to the Wits Business School 75% of
small businesses fail so it would be interesting to pursue the employment
potential taking the failure rate of small businesses into account.
Furthermore, the author considers that the requisite time and effort that
has been expended on overall management of these projects and in the
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training of small contractors could have been more effectively used in a
programme rather than on individual projects. At the end of the project
the training comes to an end and so does the contractor's work. If a long-
term programme had been established and these costs allocated to a formal
training programme far more would have been achieved per unit of managerial
expenditure and the work would continue for much longer.
A corollary of the positive attitude towards small contractors and
privatisation is a widespread scepticism within the professional
engineering community regarding the efficiency of the public sector (plus a
modicum of ignorance as to the source of funding for civil engineering).
Many engineers find it difficult to consider seriously the employment of
greater numbers of labourers within the public sector. Even if repeatedly
told they do not appear to register that the public sector is the source of
the funding and the institution responsible for the planning, control and
overall evaluation of the programme but it is not necessarily responsible
for the employment of the labour on a permanent and pensionable basis. The
conditions of employment have to be structured to ensure that "a fair day's
wage is paid for a fair day's work". The average engineer's contempt for
the public sector thus overlooks the opportunity that the public sector
could provide for large-scale action (the large scale replicability of
small scale success).
10. Wages. Conditions of Service and the Trades Unions
In Kenya labourers are hired on monthly contracts, in Botswana they
are paid monthly for * casual' employment on a daily basis. For about 60%
of the work it has been possible, through work studies, to determine the
amount of productive work that can be carried out by an able-bodied person
for the different activities, given variation in terrain, type of soil and
climatic conditions. For any particular activity the supervisor is thus
able to specify the amount of production (the "task") required in an eight
hour working day. The labourers are also informed that when they have
completed the task they may go home. It has been found that under these
circumstances an eight hour task is usually completed in six hours.
The wage rate has caused much debate. Opinions vary from those who
favour specifying the local agricultural rate to those who argue for the
construction sector minimum (if there is one) or a living wage. In
Botswana the government ruled that the wage had to be set lower than the
construction sector; in Kenya the wage was above the national minimum.
The wage that should be paid in South Africa would require . serious
consideration. On the one hand the current legislation specifies a minimum
in the construction sector (over R30 per day in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-
Vereeniging area), on the other, the lower the wage the more people that
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can be employed and the more likely that the poorer people will proffer
themselves for employment (in 1985 the SECP wage was R5 per day, this has
now risen to R7; Daveyton recently advertised temporary employment at
R7.00 per day (Sowetan. November 18, 1991)). At the COSATU seminar
mentioned earlier there were several opinions varying from the Unemployed
Workers' Union which demanded R40 per day, to others who advocated
consideration of lower wages because that meant the available funds could
employ more people. The author would not pretend that this is not a
difficult issue but he suspects that it is less divisive than might appear
at first sight. However, it is a critical issue and one that would have to
be studied at length prior to the initiation of a national employment
creation programme: part of the necessity for a "lead-in" time-period.
Agreement as to conditions of service is equally important. Part of
the success of these labour-intensive programmes was the consensus that has
been achieved between different government ministries (especially the
ministry responsible for the programme and that responsible for labour
legislation), the trades unions, the local communities and the labourers,
that wages were to be paid on a task basis and that the labourers were to
be employed either on a monthly contract or a 'casual* daily basis even if
paid monthly. It was not possible for labourers to become "permanent and
pensionable" unless they underwent training and moved into supervisory or
administrative roles.
Unless agreement can be reached prior to initiation of the programme
on these key issues of wages and conditions of service it will not be
possible to achieve reasonable productivities and a good quality product.
Most of the members of the construction industry with whom the author has
had contact have been uniformly pessimistic as to the possibility of the
Trades Unions agreeing to the conditions of service outlined above. The
inability to achieve good productivity through labour is one of the most
frequently quoted reasons for the industry's scepticism regarding labour-
intensive construction. The fact that labourers have been successfully
employed on a task basis in Hinge, Kwazulu and Soweto challenges such
misconceptions particularly since the wages were significantly lower than
the construction sector minimum.
DISCUSSION OF TWO MAJOR PROJECTS
In the light of the problems outlined above this section will discuss
two major projects that have recently been initiated.
Recently, operating mainly through government departments, the State
has released Rl billion from the strategic oil reserve. According to the
instructions received by the various government departments the money has
to be spent in such a way as to create employment. Concurrently the
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Independent Development Trust (IDT) has allocated R75O million for projects
to be undertaken by developers: the creation of employment was a stated
objective of the funds being committed.
Before discussing the major limitations with respect to employment
creation of this allocation of Rl,75 billion it is worth putting this sum
of money in perspective. If the whole amount were to be spent in a year it
would represent roughly 0,7% of GDP; however, the strategic oil reserve
money has to be spent within 15 months and the IDT within 16 months, which
means the funds represent about 0,54% of GDP or about 1,7% of the budget.
According to Abedian and Standish (1985) between 1920 and 1940 the
proportion of government expenditure on unemployment relief measures varied
from 0,6% in 1920 to 15,8% in 1935; in only two years, 1920 and 1921, was
the proportion lower than 1,7%.
In the case of both the State and the IDT projects:
(i) there has been minimal forward planning (in the case of the Rl
billion project, proposals had to be submitted within a few weeks of
the announcement; the IDT only slightly longer);
(i i) there has been neither new investigatory work nor preparatory
training;
(iii) the money has to be spent within 15 to 16 months.
Given these factors, in the light of the material presented earlier in
the paper, it is extremely doubtful that, per unit of expenditure, any
additional employment will be generated other than by the normal
expenditure of such an amount of money. Given the lack of knowledge, lead-
in time and training, essentially conventional construction methods will
have to be used.
Unlike the SECP there should be some product worth having because the
funding is being provided to government departments and private developers
(the latter can only claim re-imbursement upon evidence of work produced).
Nonetheless, on the basis of previous SECP experience together with the
speed of expenditure there is reason to suspect that much of the money will
not be used effectively.
It has been reported that the Rl billion will create 59 000 jobs for
15 months (or 47 200 per year). It remains to be seen whether these jobs
are actually created. However, even if they are, what happens at the end
of 15 months? The fact that this sort of funding has been made available
shows that it exists in some form or other. Seeing that it exists the
author would advocate that it be used in a different way to ensure more
radical restructuring of construction works, longer term results and
greater impact.
As seen above a major argument against labour-intensive methods has
been that they are considered to be more expensive. This is not the case
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for rural road construction nor municipal infrastructure. Any initial cost
advantages to equipment decrease over time with the improvement in
productivity resulting from training and increase in organisational
capacity. There might be severe cost disadvantages to bulk earthworks but
the experience in the construction and maintenance of rural roads and
municipal construction suggests that the cost differential might not be as
severe as it appears at first sight. Detailed research is required to
explore this issue.
From an employment creation perspective, however, one should seriously
consider earthworks. The civil engineering industry as a whole has a
turnover of about R6 million; 50% of that would be earthworks: R3
billion. At the current rate of R30 per day wages would amount to R7 500
per year per person. If wages amounted to half the costs each job would
cost R15 000 per year per person. R3 billion could result in 200 000 jobs
per year. A fund of Rl billion in reserve would enable the financial cost
to be a third higher for the creation of 200 000 jobs instead of the
proposed 47 200. And systems would be set in place whereby this work could
continue in a progressively competitive way.
The calculations in the previous paragraph are extremely cursory and
speculative. Far more work would be required by competent economists to
examine the extent to which the above guestimate is sensible or ridiculous.
Regardless of the accuracy of the example, the currently proposed
expenditure of State funding will not generate any more employment per unit
of expenditure, neither will it result in any systematic way of increasing
the employment created per unit of expenditure. Part of the accusation
against labour-intensive work is that it is more expensive; yet the
country has found Rl,75 billion for work that is only ostensibly labour-
intensive. The author suggests that the funds could have been used more
imaginatively to create much more employment. At present the projects
embody most of the criticisms of employment creation programmes that were
listed earlier in the paper (page 4).
Despite reservations about the way in which the Rl,75 billion will be
used the present initiative will probably have much more impact than the
SECP, (not just in relation to the quality of the product). It has
definitely forced part of the consulting and contracting fraternity to
begin to consider employment creation seriously. This new found enthusiasm
has been encouraged by:
(i) the availability of some funding for work in the absence of other
work (the civil engineering industry is operating at less than half
its scale by comparison with 1980);
(ii) the rapidly escalating costs of equipment plus the change in the tax
structure which is no longer quite as favourable for equipment
33
(recently regulations were changed so that instead of being able to
write off 50% of the cost of equipment over the first year only 20%
was allowed).
CONCLUSION
Future Progra.mm.es of Employment Creation in Construction
The tone of the paper should have shown that the author, is convinced
that it should be possible to alleviate (not solve) the unemployment
problem through employment creation in construction.
The paper has provided ample evidence of the need for further research
related to social, economic, political and technical aspects of employment
creation in construction. It is all very well to have a theory and some
evidence but in the South African context there are formidable problems in
particular:
(a) an existing construction process that is based on fundamentally
different methods of work: the changing of such a system requires
detailed attention at the analytical and design stage;
(b) the sceptical attitudes of most of those involved in this process;
even those who would be prepared to consider the methods can only
think in terms of "emergency" employment creation with the
consequence of poor quality, inefficient work;
(c) a fundamental lack of knowledge as to how to achieve results;
(d) a society that is riven with strife and there are no legitimate
national or local authorities through whom to operate, i.e. the lack
of an institutional framework.
(e) The oft reported rejection of this type of work by the Trades Unions
despite other evidence to the contrary.
Despite all the problems outlined in the paper the author still hopes
to see the establishment of a national programme of employment creation in
the different sub-sections of construction. In their paper on the poor
white problem Abedian and Standish concluded:
While relieving unemployment, the State provided many positive
externalities and many of the employment schemes contributed
significantly to the infrastructure of the country e.g. forestry
settlements, irrigation works, road construction and rail
construction. Over a two decade period the state first alleviated
and finally eradicated the poor white problem.
If an employment creation programme is to be championed by an
organisation such as COSATU it would have to develop an overall strategy
which would include the main points covered by the author earlier in the
paper:
(1) Obtain consensus on the conceptual objectives.
(2) Long term (+ 10 years) national perspective.
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(3) Detailed preparatory investigatory and analytical work, leading to
(4) Small scale pilot projects combined with embryonic training
programmes.
(5) Expansion into national programmes at the rate to which
(i) trained people can be produced from the programme;
(ii) the local and national institutions can productively absorb the
trained personnel.
The author suspects that this could only be achieved through the
creation of a dedicated goverment department, possibly through the
amalgamation of appropriate sections of existing departments of public
works, transport, water affairs, manpower and education. In order to
prepare the ground for a national employment creation programme
considerable efforts will be needed by scholars from different disciplines
to address the issues mentioned in this paper.
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